Recent mumblings around West Beirut show that a monumental paradigm shift might be occurring.
Iran appears as a greater threat to some Lebanese Sunnis than Israel. The reasoning behind this is comes from both domestic and regional factors, however, it is couched in regional terms. The arguments are not generally racist and sectarian attacks. They are further extensions of the accepted pan-Arab line (which is inherently a bit racist, but that's another issue).
The unquestioned values seem to be:
1. Strident support for the vague and shifting concept of an "Arab" cause
2. Loyalty to the Saudis, ie the Saudi peace plan with Israel proposed at the Arab League conference in Beirut in 2002
3. Using Egyptian rhetoric and political pragmatism, ie Egypt's anti-Israel propaganda coupled with recognition of the Israeli state and isolation of the Palestinians
4. Isolating Iran, Syria, and Iraq
5. Expanding the influence of Lebanese Sunni, ie the Hariri clan and Prime Minister Fouad Saniora
These arguments, however, do not manifest the crux of the argument: Sunnis are realizing/redefining their interests. Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak is the final word on Arabism, not Syrian President Bashar al Assad and Hamas.
The United States has been receiving a lot of criticism about its Middle East democracy campaign in the wake of problematic elections in Egypt and Hamas' victory in Palestine. However, these events - accompanied by Hariri's assassination, Iranian President Ahmadinejad's threatening statements, Iran's nuclear ambitions, Iran's influence over Iraq and Syria, American inability to control Iraq, Iran, and Syria, and the failed Arab League Summit in Khartoum - now have Sunnis rethinking regional political dynamics.
Sunnis used to be the dominant players in the region. The minorities were forced to use a Sunni vocabulary, which they came to dominate (think Hafez al Assad and Kamal Jumblat). Now, influence has moved in the other direction.
Simultaneously, Sunni governments must confront internal dilemmas. Osama bin Laden and Musim extremists target their regimes. The US has also cornered those regimes by refusin to continue being the punching bag. Anyway, blaming America and Israel isn't working any more. A new enemy must be found, and it lies to the east.
Worst of all, there is no superpower capable or - more importantly - willing to sort out the conflicts. Sunnis must now confront Hamas on their own without Israeli or American interaction. Iran is ready and willing to partially fill the void (ie, a $50 million contribution that barely scratches the surface of the $300 million the US alone took away). However, Iran does not need to dominate to win. All it needs to do is sustain and urge on chaos while building its domestic defense capabilities ever higher.
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This Sunni realignment is interesting for another reason. Although one can argue that there is a regional Sunni consensus emerging on the path forward, there is little talk about giving up national identities for an "Arab" one.
Lebanese Sunni are looking to increase their influence in the region, especially after the "Arabs" did not act to their liking in terms of isolating Syria. Looking to the future, Lebanese Sunni still look to Saad Hariri as their future candidate for Prime Minister despite his recent failings. This leaves Prime Minister Fouad Saniora without a job. He cannot step down as Prime Minister and return to his post at the Finance Ministry.
Lebanese Sunni are looking for Saniora to replace Amr Moussa as President of the Arab League. Nothing will exert Lebanese/Saudi influence more, while declaring the death of Syrian-style Arabism. This will be particularly potent coming after Saniora's flap with Syrian appointed Lebanese President Emile Lahoud at the Arab League conference in Khartoum in early 2006 - a conference the Saudis refused to attend.
A Lebanese/Saudi candidate will also spell the death of old style Egyptian Arabism, the kind of Arabism that entices dictators to invade countries like Yemen and Kuwait. It will also further democratize the region without threatening the monarchies. Gamal Mubarak's future is in question...
Sunday, April 23, 2006
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17 comments:
Excellent and thought-provoking post. In light of your focus on the Sunni part of the equation, what's your take on Landis' latest? :)
Note that the fall of the Assads could bring an equilibrium to the region. It's the fall of Saddam that is tipping the balance of power in Iran's favour. An Eye for an eye, and a (Shia) state for a (Sunni) state.
Where do the Lebanese Christians stand in this fight? Their elected leader is pro-HA, but Christian voters deeply distrust Iran and Syria, whateve Aoun says. So you can say that the Christian community have a schizophrenic approach to the question.
"This Sunni realignment is interesting for another reason. Although one can argue that there is a regional Sunni consensus emerging on the path forward, there is little talk about giving up national identities for an "Arab" one."
This is because the consensus is not Arab but Sunni. The majority of Arab Shias, including the Allawites, have defected to Iran.
LP
I hope that you do not mind my using your blog to make an inquiry that is not related directly to your post.
Can you confirm thevalidity of the item that French Eagle has posted from Gebka files to the effect that many Lebanese militias have resumed training on a large scale? If there is any truth to this item then the future does not look to be promising. I hope that that there is no truth to that story.
(I cannot log on to FE's space, my computer just does not allow me:-))
>> I hope that that there is no truth to that story.
There is truth to the story. Alot of truth. It has been happening since Decemper (especially the LF side of things). Sad, isn't it.
LP,
can you please elaborate on:
It will also further democratize the region without threatening the monarchies.
Thanks.
TK
Ghassan, the LF have recognized that they are training a small number of their militants. They are not the only ones. The Palestinians are getting weapons through Syria and some Murabitun elements seems to be active again.
There's no indication that the LF are training on a large scale, I doubt that they could do this without attracting attention. My guess is that they are training a small force aimed at protecting their leaders and their offices.
I suspect that this small force could be the core of a future militia, in case the political situation deteriorates, but this is pure speculation from my part. Nevertheless, the Kataeb militia of the 70's grew from a smaller forces of bodyguards, and the LF leadership can't have missed that fact. It may be pure bluffing from their part aimed at pressuring the government or HA, they could use this as a bargaining chip.
But this is pure speculation and before accusing the LF of anything, just remember that no force can match the HA, except (perhaps) the army.
Not to mention the al Qaeda nebula, various reports are indicating that there's a salafist build up in Lebanon, especially in the camps. I heard that HA has reinforced security in their turf.
LP, how do you suggest a Lebanese/Saudi candidate of the post of Arab League Secretary General will be able to overcome the opposition of the Egyptians, who we can safely say retain a lot of weight in regard to issues pertaining to the Arab League as an organization?
Hey from Oregon
A very interesting post.
Wouldn't it just be lovely if Saniora were to head up the Arab League? Do you think a dictator club would tolerate a democrat in that position, though?
I find it unlikely. His "Arab" credentials may be strong enough for the "street," but I doubt that's enough for the minders of the status quo.
Caveman,
I might post on Landis' recent article. It's a provocative read. Although his article is a clear assessment, I don't think the regional alignment is going to work out as he claims the Syrians want it to. There are still a number of unquantifiable variables floating around, which include the Hariri investigation, Syria's support for Hamas, Hezbollah's weapons, further instability in Lebanon, and instability in Iraq (which is not necessarily going in Syria's favor just because Muqtada liked Damascus so much).
What I found most fascinating was Landis' insinuation that China might use its leverage to support a pro-Iran realignment. Interesting theory, especially because it brings to mind a significant change in the direction of China: ie, is exporting commodities more important than fossil fuels? How will this be properly balanced given America's competition for those same resources?
Regardless, it's good to see an articulation of Syria's alleged new plan. We've been given the roadmap. Now we just need to find the easiest place to put the barricades. :)
Ghassan, Michael Totten, and others,
I may add a post on the militias. To say the least, I'm highly skeptical.
It would be a great honor for the Arab league, but it wouldn't be a great honor for Siniora.
TK,
Good question. I wanted to elaborate on that point more, but didn't have the space. It's also because I haven't quite found the words to express my point.
Egypt, Syria, and Libya are the biggest targets for democratic change. The governments are weak and have a difficult time controlling their own populations. Their influence does not extend as far outside their borders as the influence of the monarchies.
The monarchies can make minor changes internally and call for greater democratization regionally, thus relieving pressure from the US and Europe.
Interestingly, regionally the monarchies are democratic. The Kuwaitis and Qataris check the Saudis. The Tunisians have their own agenda. The UAE and Bahrain have a different strategy. However, they are on the same page generally. This strengthens their core position while directly stabbing at the heart of the pan-Arabist dictatorships.
The monarchies do not base themselves on a pedestal of ideology, even though they've been made to work under ideological strictures regionally until now. As the Syrian/Egyptian/Libyan Arabist dictator ideology breaks down, the only recourse is for democratic change.
Once again, it's still a point I'm flushing out. See my next comment for related thoughts.
Omego80,
Good point. The controls of the Arab League are being taken away from the Egyptians. If they decide to go to war over it, the organization will break down (as they most likely realize). The GCC countries, Tunisia, Iraq, and Lebanon will no longer find a home in an Egyptian dominated body.
Egypt, too, is changing. It will find it very difficult to break from the Saudi consensus to align itself with Sudan, Syria, and Hamas.
Also, Egyptian internal dynamics are of paramount importance. Mubarak's succession is a regional issue, not domestic. The Egyptians have claimed to have regional authority, but now the influence has turned around and the region wants to influence Egypt. Should Gamal be the next President is the topic of discussion in many "Arab" countries.
Amr Moussa also have significant sway with both the Egyptian public and Arab regimes. He will want to retain Egypt's strength at the League, but he won't be in much of a bargaining position once he's fighting Gamal and the Muslim Brotherhood simultaneously on his home turf.
A crude description, but the fastest one I can provide.
unfortunately,shei3a hate sunnis and are always thinking of anything to gain power over the majority muslim sunni.Rafiq el hariri was our sunni leader peace upon his soul and we prefer if you do not naively say that sheikh saad fail because he will succeed and iran is not a good future for muslim religion, we have to accept the fact that israel and america are present and try to benifit and not make propaganda!!!bashar asaad i wish he falls!!!
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