Nothing Known about Lebanon Right Now

Lots of bloviating about Lebanon is going on right now, and none of it matters.

There are no trends. There are few plans. The plans that are already in the works have not propelleled far enough for them to become apparent enough to talk about.

There is a power vacuum, and many parties are trying to fill the void.

At the moment, some figures have increased their power, but that could be destroyed quickly.

For months I wrote about divisions within the Future Movement noting that three general strains exist:

1) a pro-business, pro-tourism, non-sectarian, not very religious, Dubai-style Arabism, diplomatically anti-Syria, interested in decreasing state coercion of citizens while increasing state control over crime, foreign policy, the flow of goods in and out of the country, and more. This strain is represented by Prime Minister Saniora;

2) pro-business through strengthening already present Lebanese monopolies and increasing the presence of Gulf money, pro-Sunni (and somewhat anti-Shia and anti-Palestinian), entirely sectarian, supportive of being a Saudi vassal state, generic Sunni pan-Arabist, violently anti-Syria, slightly in favor of the Iraqi insurgency, willing to pay bribes to get things done, willing to compromise values for political expediency, dependent more on foreign sources of power than domestic. This strain is represented by Saad Hariri.

3) somewhat socialist, pro-governmental subsidies, entirely Sunni sectarian, actively pro-Palestinian, supportive of the Iraqi insurgency, supportive of attacks against Israel (even though it's primarily a Shia campaign, entirely pan-Arabists. These are, basically, Nasserists. This strain is represented somewhat by Walid Ido and Bahia Hariri.

Shaheed Rafiq Hariri brought these three elements together. These elements have been moving further and further apart since his assassination.

Right now, Fouad Saniora has the most power within the Future Movement, and he has the most power on the Lebanese political scene.

But this will not last without an aggressive campaign on his part.

Saniora's wing of the Tayyar Mustaqbal is the most powerful politically and the most attractive to non-Sunnis, but it is not the primary vote getter for the party. Saniora has little support in the street. He is not a sectarian leader. He commands hearts and minds, but not feet, which in a feudal, sectarian, militant society like Lebanon, matter more than anything else. Most Lebanese hated the civil war. Their hearts and minds were with Musa Sadr, Raymond Edde, Fairouz, Magida Roumi, Rafiq Hariri, Rene Muawad, but feet were with the warlords who kept the conflict going.

Saniora has support, but politically, he's a compromise candidate, which is why he is so good. He is not the favorite candidate of the Future Movement, Amal, Hezbollah, President Lahoud, Syria, or Amr Moussa. Christians have no vehement opposition to him, as they would to Saad Hariri. He has the support of Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, even if Jumblatt plays games behind his back at times, like he did in 2005 when Saniora was in New York and DC.

Because of this, his power could deflate at any time. He could lose support from the Future Movement. Hezbollah could overpower him. The Christians will not actively promote him, and Walid Jumblatt will triangulate.

Syria, as usual, is actively opposing Saniora knowing that he is the least likely person in Lebanon to make a deal with them. Saad Hariri, Walid Jumblatt, Christian leaders, and the Shia leadership have all shown their willingness to cave to Syrian demands. Saniora has stuck by virtues, and for this he maintains the support of the Sunni and Druze, which have no desire to move back into the Syrian camp.

But if Hezbollah and Syria manage to become stronger, there is nothing that Saniora or the pro-Saniora Western governments can do to stop them.

We must hope and pray that Prime Minister Saniora has a few tricks up his sleeve and can keep dissenters within his own movement under control.