Jumblatt Watching and the Need for a National Dialogue

“Whenever I want to know how bad the situation is in Lebanon, I look in the trunk of Rabieh’s car. If there are only a few revolvers, the situation is fine. If there are a few automatic weapons, the situation is tense. And if it is packed with AKs and M16s, I know the situation could explode at any time,” says a friend of mine in the Democratic Left Party.

Rabieh is a mid-level member of the primarily Druze Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) who lives in Wata Msseitbeh, the hotbed, frontline PSP neighborhood in Beirut surrounded by Shia, Sunni, and Palestinian neighborhoods. It is the PSP equivalent of Sunni Tariq al Jadideh and Shia Haret al Hreik.

Progressive Socialist Party leader and Druze chieftain Walid Jumblatt sends orders to Rabieh. Jumblatt is notorious for his shifting political positions. Some criticize him for not having any values. More likely, his opinion shifts because he better grasps the Lebanese political situation on a local, regional, and international level than any other actor; and thus, he is normally ahead of most political trends.

Leave Hezbollah Alone

While most members of the March 14 Coalition call Parliamentary Speaker Nabih al Berri a disingenuous negotiator, Jumblatt argues on behalf of the national dialogue Berri announced after his recent trip to Damascus. Jumblatt also argued that there should be no discussion of Hezbollah’s weapons at this session of the dialogue.

Jumblatt’s stance is particularly interesting. During the national dialogue in 2005, Jumblatt was the main antagonist against Hezbollah. The dialogue was postponed so Jumblatt could meet with US government officials in Washington and proclaim from American soil that the Shebaa Farms are not Lebanese territory. During the dialogue, he routinely attacked the opposition and urged other members of the March 14 Coalition not to acquiesce to Hezbollah demands.

In the end, Jumblatt was right. Hezbollah got absolutely everything they wanted. The Future Movement agreed with Hezbollah that “Israel is the enemy,” agreeing that Syria is a sister nation, agreeing that Palestinians outside the camps should be disarmed (which Hezbollah knew it prevent from ever being implemented), and deciding that the Shebaa Farms are, in fact, Lebanese territory. Before the majority could discuss any of its demands – particularly agreeing to national support for the investigation of and tribunal over the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafiq al Hariri, Berri postponed the dialogue indefinitely and Jumblatt’s seemingly recalcitrant positions were vindicated.

Now, while the rest of the March 14 Coalition is recalcitrant, Jumblatt is making concessions to the opposition.

Why is Jumblatt doing this?

I have not interviewed Walid Jumblatt recently, so I do not know why he is taking his current positions. However, I am in agreement with him, and this is why:

1. Syria and Iran will not cede Lebanon to the March 14 Coalition. They are willing to take the country to war – proven in 2006, willing to destroy the economy – proven by the 18 month occupation of Beirut’s downtown and the presidential vacuum, and willing to assassinate anyone who gets in their way.

2. Western countries, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the international coalition supporting Lebanon are not willing to go to the same lengths as the Iranians and Syrians. Israel and the United States are the countries most likely to take aggressive action against the Syrians, but it seems doubtful that they will even consider doing so before 2009. The Syrians and Iranians also know that they can keep the US and Israel busy by promoting conflicts in Iraq, Palestine, and Lebanon.

3. Hezbollah is the most powerful force in Lebanon. They are likely more powerful now than they were in 2006, and are definitely more paranoid of other Lebanese now than at any other time. Rumors in security circles, even before the assassination of Imad Mughnieh, contend that Hezbollah is no longer concerned with domestic Lebanese politics and is entirely focused on attacking Israel. They have effectively prevented the Lebanese government from electing a president, and are fully capable of blocking almost anything they want. The main effort now is not to try and isolate Hezbollah, but to bring them back into the fold and try to convince them to moderate their behavior (ie, prevent entirely erratic and nationally dangerous behavior), given that there is no way any Lebanese entity can force Hezbollah to do anything it is not willing to do.

4. If Iran and Syria are not placated in some way, the current Lebanese situation will undoubtedly get worse. The goal right now is to minimize concessions.


The March 14 Coalition must not give the Syrians an excuse to return to Lebanese territory, and it must do this by negotiating with the Lebanese opposition. Parliamentary member Michel el-Murr acted too late to have any effect on the presidential debate, but he could be a useful broker alongside Nabih al-Berri in forging an agreement. March 14 cannot allow the situation to devolve any further. Hezbollah has too much power, and the government bears too much responsibility in the eyes of Lebanese citizens. Hezbollah continues to arm and prepare for war, while the Lebanese government is on dry ice.


However, Jumblatt is not conceding the majority’s interests. He is mindful of the opposition’s strength, and sees an opportunity for the majority to make gains.

5. Even if Hezbollah is aloof to Lebanon and Lebanese politics, why should other politicians not treat Hezbollah as an equal parliamentary bargaining partner?

5. These dialogues are being proposed by the opposition and the Syrians. This is a golden opportunity for March 14 because the government is following the letter of the law and is proposing nothing radical or unreasonable. The majority has proven its willingness to convene at parliament and elect a president, while the opposition refuses to show up. The majority should do the same with the dialogue, show up and then watch as opposition parliamentarian Michel Aoun and Hezbollah refuse to join. The majority has called the opposition's bluff before by naming General Michel Sleiman - originally thought of as the opposition's choice for president - as their choice for Lebanon's highest office. Even if the dialogue does occur, yet is not televised, it will become apparent to the Lebanese people that the opposition is blocking reconciliation.

6. The majority made concessions to the opposition in 2006 and the opposition must be reminded of this. Why even debate about electing a president? That is what parliament is for. Why not return to the 2006 agenda? It will be very easy for the majority to concede the opposition's demand of veto power if the opposition is willing to support the Hariri tribunal and demarcating the border with Syria.

7. Will it be possible to splinter at least part of the opposition, like parliamentarian Michel el-Murr's recent split from their ranks, if all of the opposition members are sitting in a room with the majority and able to hear arguments for themselves and see who is really blocking the advancement of the nation?

8. Even if the dialogue is not televised, it will become apparent to the Lebanese people that the opposition is blocking reconciliation.

Update:

9. Although Lebanon's Western allies are not willing to act in depraved ways on behalf of their Lebanese allies, the United States, France, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and others are remaining firm in their resolve and are operating within international institutions for the betterment of Lebanon.

Update 2:

Former Lebanese president and Kataeb party leader Amin Gemayel now supports the national dialogue, despite his recent arguments to the contrary. His decision comes after meeting with Future Movement leader Saad al-Hariri, and he explicitly cites the arguments of Walid Jumblatt in his support for the dialogue.