A New Siniora Government

President Michel Sleiman re-appointed Prime Minister Fouad Siniora.

Working too much today, but here's a quick, off-the-cuff reaction about why this is good:

1) it keeps in power a man reknowned for his ability to reconcile fighting factions;

2) it goes a good ways to guarantee that the opposition won't whittle away at the reforms of the previous government;

3) it unites 14 March leaders, and gives the 14 March Coalition bona fides as a unified movement, not just an organization bought and paid for by the Hariri's and Saudi Arabia. Calls for Muhammad Safadi to be elected as premier are being made by the opposition, but are not legitimate. I'm sure that there are plenty of other people who want to be named prime minister, but after the recent conflicts and given that the Future Movement is the majority group in parliament, an experienced prime minister with national support is the best option. The choice is for 14 March to make about the prime minister. It is an internal decision (for more on this, see below);

4) Lebanon needs an experienced prime minister will guarantee to Lebanon's foreign allies, like the United States, France, and Saudi Arabia, that Hezbollah did not mount a coup, despite the changes that occurred.

4) The leader of the government should not be the leader of the Sunni community, for then any removal of him would appear as a slight to the Sunnis as a whole, not removal based on incompetence or for the sake of compromise. The whole of Lebanon is burdened under the weight of Nabih al Berri because the majority of Shia legislators claim that any slight against him is a slight against all Shia, which is ridiculous, but beneficial to both Berri and Hezbollah;

5) If Amal and Hezbollah complain about Siniora being prime minister, then Berri's seat is on the line. The president was a consensus choice, but the prime minister's office is not on the table.
The Sunni and Shia have united around specific factions, and they will not retreat. This is especially true given the way Speaker Berri has failed to do his job and proven to be entirely aligned with Syria and the opposition. The prime minister might not be the leader of the Sunnis, but given the way the Shia have set the table, the PM should at least be appointed by the Sunnis.

6) For the Future Movement:
a. any of Siniora's failings will be blamed on him, not Saad, who is inexperienced and might fail when faced with Lebanon's experienced political class;
b. Siniora can compromise on issues that the Saudis might not want Saad Hariri to compromise on;
c. appointing Siniora shows strength in the face of weakness (remember what happened to Future TV and Beirut).

This is a Sunni-Shia issue. Michel Aoun, Sleiman Franjieh, and Assad Hardane are taking the lead in attacking Siniora. Hezballah/Amal feel the same way as the rest of the opposition, but have to keep their mouths shut or risk putting Berri's job on the line (and there are many qualified Shia within the opposition waiting for this to happen).

Christian Lebanon lost its influence long ago, and a weak president like Sleiman guarantees that the Sunni and Shia will dictate to the president. The choice of Sleiman makes it impossible for the president to have enough power of office or character to moderate between the two sides. He will have to find some independent power base equal to the immense amount of domestic power of Future/Hezbollah/Amal, or take one side.

The Syrians refused a powerful president in Lebanon, because they know that this would open a space for a Christian president to fill the broker position Syria occupied during its reign.

Given that the 1960 electoral law is empowering Franjieh and other Christian zuama, the Christians will lose relevance almost completely and be junior partners in any future parliament or government. Some Christians will side with 14 March and others with 8 March. This will most likely guarantee that the Christians keep the number of seats in parliament allocated to them, and the apportionment in government hiring. Christians represent more than a third of the population, based on multiple estimates, but occupy 50% of parliamentary seats. The Sunni and Shia won't risk uniting all Christians together by bringing up these questions, and the Lebanese agenda will continue to be dictated by the Sunni Mustaqbal and the Shia HA/Amal for the time being.