Observations and Hypotheses About the Situation in Lebanon

1) It seems like Hezbollah and the opposition are backing down. Hezbollah achieved its goal, and is currently willing to negotiate. Will they bully the government using a threat of violence, again? Most definitely.

Given that Qatar leads the Arab League delegation, it seems the Qatari balancing act - often perceived as pro-Syrian and Iranian bias - might offer at least some sort of agreement. Rumor has it that Qatar is representing Iranian interests more than the Syrian interests. I heard one claim today from a Future analyst that Iran and Hezbollah are upset with the Syrian regime, and that the Iranians do not want a fight between Sunni and Shia in Lebanon, which has already had regional implications. Obviously, given I have only one somewhat knowledgeable source, I have no idea if this is true.


2) I hear rumors from friends of friends in the south that Hezbollah is taking up strategic positions in the area and taking territory they previously did not have on the border. Some of these places are in Christian towns. Could Hezbollah be negotiating with the government now because it knows it will attack Israel which will rain down devastation next week, paralyzing the government, and giving Hezbollah full control of foreign policy, the means of violence, and media airtime? Who knows?

Where is Unifil? They are working within the confines of United Nations bureaucracy, ie not fulfilling their mandate, but supplying plenty of vetrinary care to the livestock in the region and free karate lessons to the youth.


3) Hezbollah initially came out to "support" the unions protesting the minimum wage and the price of food. I have not noticed a price increase, yet, but given that the border, the airport, and the ports have been closed, I would assume that demand for foodstuffs is quickly outpacing supply, thus the prices will soon rise. An employee with the Lebanese Ministry of Finance mentioned last night that Lebanon imports many food sources, including most of its grain. Bread is a significant staple of the Lebanese diet, and is the first supply to run out whenever conflict arises, as it did in Beirut during this conflict on the first day residents could leave their houses, and as it did during the opening days of the 2006 war.


4) The failures of Lebanese and Palestinian democracies might begin to fuel pro-regime, Islamic treatises on behalf of dictatorship and against democratic reform. Conservative Muslims normally cite Quran and Hadith to say that tyranny is better than revolution, because in revolution there is chaos, and chaos is what must absolutely be avoided. The chaos and disgusting behaviors that occured in Beirut and Gaza could easily support regime claims about stability and preserving the Islamic way of life.

Given the success of Dubai, it seems like Arab regimes are moving toward Plato's philosopher king model, or Machiavelli's educated prince (Qatar's scheming Sheikh Hamad?) more than anything else.

This argument on behalf of dictatorship also plays into the patronizing realist worldview in which it is better to negotiate with a strongman regime who supports one's views than to support democracy in which there is no predictable outcome. This argument is obviously also based on the assumption that the negotiating party is in a position of greater power than the totalitarian regime.