I broke into the Beirut synagogue.
It wasn't hard. The gate has a lock on it, but it was knocked down, and the security guards no longer patrol the place as vigilantly. The Ottoman era buildings around the synagogue have been destroyed, and the edifice poses no security risk to the Prime Minister's Grand Serail or Future Movement leader Saad Hariri's future residence.
My friend and I climbed over the trees growing in the courtyard and walked into the main hall, decorated with 6-point stars. The front of the synagogue was desecrated. The holy documents were intentionally removed, but the other ornamental structures were destroyed.
Twenty foot tall trees grow where pews should be. The support beams of the roof still exist, but the tiles are destroyed. The staircase to the upper women's section remains intact.
Hebrew graffiti adorns the walls. I don't know what it says, but I assume Jews from abroad journeyed in and wrote on both the side walls and the front area where the arc is supposed to reside.
Jews are not the only group to have a downtown religious establishment remain in shambles. Two Greek Catholic churches lie in disarray in Beirut's downtown. One of them is in stumbling distance of the parliament, and the other is closer to the Parliament building than the synagogue.
However, the Greek Catholic community has fully operable churches in Beirut and is a functioning sect in Lebanon's confessional democracy.
Sadly, Jews remain in hiding in Lebanon.
Media reports about Beirut's synagogue, such as this, are heartening. Unfortunately, I doubt that much action will be taken to restore the synagogue in the coming months.
Thursday, September 18, 2008
Sunday, September 14, 2008
M14 Did Not Assassinate Aridi
Hezbollah-led March 8 alliance spokespeople suggest that forces opposed to them assassinated Druze March 8 member Saleh Aridi.
They argue that Druze leader Walid Jumblatt is moving away from his anti-Hezbollah allies, and is thus being sent a message not to ally with Hezbollah. It is suggested - and sometimes openly claimed - that the Saudi-backed March 14 coalition is responsible for assassinating Aridi.
Members of Jumblatt's Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) have argued that Israel assassinated Aridi; thus, blaming the Arab world's perpetual rhetorical enemy instead of provoking a confrontation with either the March 8 or 14 coalition.
It is unlikely that M14 assassinated Aridi because:
1. M14 members know Jumblatt. This is the leader whose political decisions did not shift when a key PSP member, parliamentarian, policy maker, and negotiator, Marwan Hamade, was nearly assassinated in 2004. Jumblatt did not reverse his political decision. He merely stopped voicing it as loudly, while working ever harder with Rafiq Hariri to win the 2005 parliamentary elections and oust the Syrians.
2. Assassinations and threats to his life did not stop Jumblatt from advocating his positions over the last three years. Assassinations of March 14 coalition members only amplified and intensified Jumblatt's words.
3. Jumblatt refused to bow to Hezbollah's demands, even when his house in Clemenceau was under attack during the May events. Why would he be afraid of an assassination targeting someone who, until May, was a hated political opponent?
4. M14 generally uses money to buy allies (for example, quieting the Jund al-Sham conflicts with Saida residents, and also the "freezing" of the Salafist memorandum of understanding with Hezbollah). Aridi would not be the first person on M14's assassination list if it decided to take up that heinous policy.
5. The kind of bomb used to assassinate Aridi is similar to the kind used to assassinate Georges Hawi, and used in the failed assassination attempt against May Chidiac.
This fifth point is of particular significance. In 2005, press reports claimed that Georges Hawi was assassinated because he was acting as an emissary between Jumblatt and the Assad regime. This would suggest that Hawi's assassination was a clear message to Jumblatt that the Syrians have no interest in reconciliation with him.
LDP leader Talal Arslan was recently in Syria meeting with Assad at the Syrian presidential palace. Arslan and Jumblatt have reconciled their differences and are isolating some of Syria's closest Druze allies, like Wiam Wahhab, in preparation for the 2009 elections.
Recall that the Hamade assassination attempt occurred after the 2004 presidential elections, but before the 2005 parliamentary elections. The Aridi assassination occurred after the 2008 presidential elections, and before the 2009 parliamentary elections.
Something else to consider is the upcoming national dialogue, during which Lebanese parties will discuss critical issues about defense policy, national unity, and the 2009 electoral law. During the 2006 national dialogue, Jumblatt was the most anti-Hezbollah leader. His position has moderated since then, but Jumblatt is still no ally of Hezbollah or the Syrian regime. Arslan is.
Given that Jumblatt is significantly more powerful than Arslan - the junior member of this alliance, Syria is losing an ally while another close ally (Wahhab) is entirely isolated. The regime gains nothing from this alliance, but can preserve some influence in the Druze community if it prevents Arslan from moving closer to Jumblatt.
Arslan knows that he will lose support and credibility in his community if he does not work in coordination with Jumblatt, but will also lose his independence from Jumblatt if Syria removes its support. The Aridi assassination was most likely a message to Arslan that support might not be the only things the Syrians take away from him.
Arslan is allied with Syria's worst enemy. Secondly, he is the first influential pro-Syrian figure to attempt an independent political move.
These are all indications suggesting that the individuals who began assassinating anti-Syrian Lebanese leaders beginning in 2004 could possibly also be responsible for Aridi's assassination.
Nothing will completely exonerate the March 14 coalition in the opposition press. Try proving a negative. However, nothing suggests that M14 had anything to do with it.
They argue that Druze leader Walid Jumblatt is moving away from his anti-Hezbollah allies, and is thus being sent a message not to ally with Hezbollah. It is suggested - and sometimes openly claimed - that the Saudi-backed March 14 coalition is responsible for assassinating Aridi.
Members of Jumblatt's Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) have argued that Israel assassinated Aridi; thus, blaming the Arab world's perpetual rhetorical enemy instead of provoking a confrontation with either the March 8 or 14 coalition.
It is unlikely that M14 assassinated Aridi because:
1. M14 members know Jumblatt. This is the leader whose political decisions did not shift when a key PSP member, parliamentarian, policy maker, and negotiator, Marwan Hamade, was nearly assassinated in 2004. Jumblatt did not reverse his political decision. He merely stopped voicing it as loudly, while working ever harder with Rafiq Hariri to win the 2005 parliamentary elections and oust the Syrians.
2. Assassinations and threats to his life did not stop Jumblatt from advocating his positions over the last three years. Assassinations of March 14 coalition members only amplified and intensified Jumblatt's words.
3. Jumblatt refused to bow to Hezbollah's demands, even when his house in Clemenceau was under attack during the May events. Why would he be afraid of an assassination targeting someone who, until May, was a hated political opponent?
4. M14 generally uses money to buy allies (for example, quieting the Jund al-Sham conflicts with Saida residents, and also the "freezing" of the Salafist memorandum of understanding with Hezbollah). Aridi would not be the first person on M14's assassination list if it decided to take up that heinous policy.
5. The kind of bomb used to assassinate Aridi is similar to the kind used to assassinate Georges Hawi, and used in the failed assassination attempt against May Chidiac.
This fifth point is of particular significance. In 2005, press reports claimed that Georges Hawi was assassinated because he was acting as an emissary between Jumblatt and the Assad regime. This would suggest that Hawi's assassination was a clear message to Jumblatt that the Syrians have no interest in reconciliation with him.
LDP leader Talal Arslan was recently in Syria meeting with Assad at the Syrian presidential palace. Arslan and Jumblatt have reconciled their differences and are isolating some of Syria's closest Druze allies, like Wiam Wahhab, in preparation for the 2009 elections.
Recall that the Hamade assassination attempt occurred after the 2004 presidential elections, but before the 2005 parliamentary elections. The Aridi assassination occurred after the 2008 presidential elections, and before the 2009 parliamentary elections.
Something else to consider is the upcoming national dialogue, during which Lebanese parties will discuss critical issues about defense policy, national unity, and the 2009 electoral law. During the 2006 national dialogue, Jumblatt was the most anti-Hezbollah leader. His position has moderated since then, but Jumblatt is still no ally of Hezbollah or the Syrian regime. Arslan is.
Given that Jumblatt is significantly more powerful than Arslan - the junior member of this alliance, Syria is losing an ally while another close ally (Wahhab) is entirely isolated. The regime gains nothing from this alliance, but can preserve some influence in the Druze community if it prevents Arslan from moving closer to Jumblatt.
Arslan knows that he will lose support and credibility in his community if he does not work in coordination with Jumblatt, but will also lose his independence from Jumblatt if Syria removes its support. The Aridi assassination was most likely a message to Arslan that support might not be the only things the Syrians take away from him.
Arslan is allied with Syria's worst enemy. Secondly, he is the first influential pro-Syrian figure to attempt an independent political move.
These are all indications suggesting that the individuals who began assassinating anti-Syrian Lebanese leaders beginning in 2004 could possibly also be responsible for Aridi's assassination.
Nothing will completely exonerate the March 14 coalition in the opposition press. Try proving a negative. However, nothing suggests that M14 had anything to do with it.
Russia Supports Jordan More than Syria?
Tony Badran argues that the relationship between the Syrian regime and Russia might not be as strong that President Assad insinuates.
Badran argues:
Badran argues:
Badran provides a close look at President Assad's recent overtures toward Russia, and Russian relations with other (pro-US) Middle Eastern countries. Must read.Far less media attention was given to another visitor to Russia at around the same time that Assad arrived there: Jordan's King Abdullah. The king's visit was focused mainly on military and technical cooperation. Jordan has developed a number of joint military ventures with the Russians in recent years.
A few days later Premier Vladimir Putin - who had met with King Abdullah but not with Assad - also received Saudi Prince Bandar bin Sultan. The Saudis began discussing arms deals with the Russians last year, when Putin made his historic visit to the kingdom when he was still president. Meanwhile, Saudi-Syrian relations have sunk to their lowest levels in recent history. Whatever the purpose of Bandar's visit, the Russians were clearly not giving Syria any special privileges, and seemingly they were not interested in placing all their eggs in Bashar Assad's basket.
Wednesday, September 10, 2008
Targeting the Druze?
The first assassination after the May conflict and the Doha agreement is yet another attack on a Druze target. A car bomb in the village of Baisour killed Lebanese Democratic Party politburo member Saleh Aride.
This was no accident. Car bombs are not meant to be subtle, especially when used in the quiet, mountainous Druze heartland.
Hezbollah made the Druze community as a whole their target during their May campaign. Progressive Socialist Party leader Walid Jumblatt reinforced his alliance with rival Druze leader Talal Arslan during and after the Hezbollah attacks on their community. Arslan is a friend and supporter of the Assad regime and the March 8 coalition. However, he is the junior partner in his alliance with Jumblatt
The assassination of one of Arslan's core supporters might be a message to Arslan to move away from Jumblatt and not provide him with pro-Syrian cover as Jumblatt tries to move away from the March 14 coalition. From 2004-8, Jumblatt was the most vociferous critic of the Syrian regime. The Damascus regime detests him more than any other Lebanese leader.
This assassination might be a statement from the Syrians to Jumblatt and Arslan that an entente between Jumblatt and Damascus is impossible. It might be a message to Arslan to realign himself. It might be a message to pro-Syrian Shia Amal leader Nabih Berri not to align himself too closely with Jumblatt, because Jumblatt is still persona non grata in Damascus. It has recently been reported that Jumblatt and Berri are trying to create a third way that opposes both the March 14 coalition and Hezbollah.
Some Lebanese claim that March 14 forces are responsible for the assassination to send a message to Jumblatt not to stray too far. However, this seems unlikely.
It is possible that Aride was involved in other activities that might have made him a target. We will most likely find out more in the coming hours and days.
This was no accident. Car bombs are not meant to be subtle, especially when used in the quiet, mountainous Druze heartland.
Hezbollah made the Druze community as a whole their target during their May campaign. Progressive Socialist Party leader Walid Jumblatt reinforced his alliance with rival Druze leader Talal Arslan during and after the Hezbollah attacks on their community. Arslan is a friend and supporter of the Assad regime and the March 8 coalition. However, he is the junior partner in his alliance with Jumblatt
The assassination of one of Arslan's core supporters might be a message to Arslan to move away from Jumblatt and not provide him with pro-Syrian cover as Jumblatt tries to move away from the March 14 coalition. From 2004-8, Jumblatt was the most vociferous critic of the Syrian regime. The Damascus regime detests him more than any other Lebanese leader.
This assassination might be a statement from the Syrians to Jumblatt and Arslan that an entente between Jumblatt and Damascus is impossible. It might be a message to Arslan to realign himself. It might be a message to pro-Syrian Shia Amal leader Nabih Berri not to align himself too closely with Jumblatt, because Jumblatt is still persona non grata in Damascus. It has recently been reported that Jumblatt and Berri are trying to create a third way that opposes both the March 14 coalition and Hezbollah.
Some Lebanese claim that March 14 forces are responsible for the assassination to send a message to Jumblatt not to stray too far. However, this seems unlikely.
It is possible that Aride was involved in other activities that might have made him a target. We will most likely find out more in the coming hours and days.
Saturday, September 06, 2008
The Russia/Georgia Conflict: The Syrian/Israeli Connection
The Russian invasion of Georgia caught much of the Middle East by surprise, but political actors here were quick to try and capitalize off of it.
Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah gave a speech comparing the West's support for Georgia to the West's support for Israel. Just as the West could not prevent the righteous Russians from invading sovereign Georgia, he argued, the West would eventually fall to the might of Hezbollah and other forces opposed to Israel.
Given Hezbollah's May putsch in Beirut against the internationally supported Siniora government, some Lebanese saw Nasrallah's remarks as justifying the forceful takeover of a democratically elected, Western supported government. The Beirut press filled with reports about Hezbollah acquiring sophisticated new weaponry - advanced anti-aircraft systems and missiles - from the Russians.
Syrian President Bashar Assad made a grand play, going to Moscow to ask the Russians for a major weapons deals. Assad offered the Russians Syrian soil on which to locate missile batteries.
The Lebanese and Israeli press, as usual, briefly went berserk. However, the news that the Russians were sending an aircraft carrier to Latakia did not ruffle many feathers because, allegedly, the aircraft carrier in question is old, should have been decommissioned, and might not be fit for combat.
Israel, however, used the Georgia invasion to tacitly and the effectively maneuver its way into a better regional bargaining position than their opponents.
The details:
Hezbollah was eager to score a rhetorical victory. They – allegedly in coordination with the Syrians - planted many of the news items about Russian military acquisitions scare their local opponents, knowing that the March 14 press would embellish the story even further.
The Syrian President saw an opportunity, but had nothing to give the Russians in return. The Syrians like to present themselves as eager allies of the Russians, and continuously mention the important Syrian relationship with the Soviet Union.
However, Assad never made the case as to why the Russians would want to plant missiles in Syria, or why the Russians would want to sell weapons to the Syrians. He assumed, like many others in the Middle East, that the Russians – historic supporters of Arab Nationalism and the Palestinian cause – would be eager to take an opportunity to support the most anti-American regime in the Arab world.
Yet, what interests do the Russians have in upsetting Turkey (a NATO member), the European Union, Arab regimes in the Middle East, the United States and its forces in Iraq, and the Israelis? Russian missiles in Syria would provide greater credibility to Assad, but how would the Russians benefit from that, given the immense amount of opposition they would face.
The Russians quickly dismissed Assad’s advances, and agreed to sell him minor weapons systems and sent the carrier as a show of support.
The Israelis were always one step ahead of the Syrians.
Before Assad crafted his plan, the Israelis had already negotiated a deal with the Russians.
Israel was an ardent supporter of Georgia’s nascent democracy, and was one of its main suppliers of advanced weaponry. Media outlets regularly noted that Georgia’s defense minister is Jewish. Israeli officials vocally supported Georgian President Saakashvili… until a few weeks ago.
According to a number of reports, the Israelis made a deal with Russia that they would stop providing weaponry and rhetorical support to the Georgians. In return, the Russians agreed not to change the security status quo in the Middle East. They refused to sell any weapons systems to the Syrians or Syria’s regional allies that would change regional dynamics.
Russia strengthened its sphere of influence, sending a message to the United States and Europe. The Israelis sent a message to Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah that the Russians have no interest in changing the regional balance. Then, Condoleeza Rice went to Libya…
Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah gave a speech comparing the West's support for Georgia to the West's support for Israel. Just as the West could not prevent the righteous Russians from invading sovereign Georgia, he argued, the West would eventually fall to the might of Hezbollah and other forces opposed to Israel.
Given Hezbollah's May putsch in Beirut against the internationally supported Siniora government, some Lebanese saw Nasrallah's remarks as justifying the forceful takeover of a democratically elected, Western supported government. The Beirut press filled with reports about Hezbollah acquiring sophisticated new weaponry - advanced anti-aircraft systems and missiles - from the Russians.
Syrian President Bashar Assad made a grand play, going to Moscow to ask the Russians for a major weapons deals. Assad offered the Russians Syrian soil on which to locate missile batteries.
The Lebanese and Israeli press, as usual, briefly went berserk. However, the news that the Russians were sending an aircraft carrier to Latakia did not ruffle many feathers because, allegedly, the aircraft carrier in question is old, should have been decommissioned, and might not be fit for combat.
Israel, however, used the Georgia invasion to tacitly and the effectively maneuver its way into a better regional bargaining position than their opponents.
The details:
Hezbollah was eager to score a rhetorical victory. They – allegedly in coordination with the Syrians - planted many of the news items about Russian military acquisitions scare their local opponents, knowing that the March 14 press would embellish the story even further.
The Syrian President saw an opportunity, but had nothing to give the Russians in return. The Syrians like to present themselves as eager allies of the Russians, and continuously mention the important Syrian relationship with the Soviet Union.
However, Assad never made the case as to why the Russians would want to plant missiles in Syria, or why the Russians would want to sell weapons to the Syrians. He assumed, like many others in the Middle East, that the Russians – historic supporters of Arab Nationalism and the Palestinian cause – would be eager to take an opportunity to support the most anti-American regime in the Arab world.
Yet, what interests do the Russians have in upsetting Turkey (a NATO member), the European Union, Arab regimes in the Middle East, the United States and its forces in Iraq, and the Israelis? Russian missiles in Syria would provide greater credibility to Assad, but how would the Russians benefit from that, given the immense amount of opposition they would face.
The Russians quickly dismissed Assad’s advances, and agreed to sell him minor weapons systems and sent the carrier as a show of support.
The Israelis were always one step ahead of the Syrians.
Before Assad crafted his plan, the Israelis had already negotiated a deal with the Russians.
Israel was an ardent supporter of Georgia’s nascent democracy, and was one of its main suppliers of advanced weaponry. Media outlets regularly noted that Georgia’s defense minister is Jewish. Israeli officials vocally supported Georgian President Saakashvili… until a few weeks ago.
According to a number of reports, the Israelis made a deal with Russia that they would stop providing weaponry and rhetorical support to the Georgians. In return, the Russians agreed not to change the security status quo in the Middle East. They refused to sell any weapons systems to the Syrians or Syria’s regional allies that would change regional dynamics.
Russia strengthened its sphere of influence, sending a message to the United States and Europe. The Israelis sent a message to Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah that the Russians have no interest in changing the regional balance. Then, Condoleeza Rice went to Libya…
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